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Abstract
In 2006, China enacted its ﬁrst rescue-oriented Enterprise Bankruptcy Law with the aim of
establishing its corporate rescue culture. But the corporate reorganization procedure that is at
the heart of the new bankruptcy law has not been used frequently. It is appropriate to ask
why the use of China’s new corporate rescue law has been so low.Meanwhile, in the existing
corporate reorganizations under the 2006 Law, most debtors were excluded from the
reorganization process, so that the Chinese new debtor-in-possession model, which seems to
be a desirable control format, was largely shelved. Why so? This article explores these two
issues through the use of empirical data collected from Zhejiang, a province with a
signiﬁcantly larger number of reorganizations than most other Chinese provinces.
This article seeks to examine the main characteristics of China’s new corporate
reorganization regime enshrined in its newly-enacted Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of
2006 (the EBL 2006). Speciﬁcally, it explores two questions. First, it asks why China’s
new rescue law has not been widely used to rehabilitate troubled companies so as to
save jobs and preserve going concern value.1 Second, it asks why the administrator-
in-possession approach rather than the legislated debtor-in-possession approach
continues to be preferred in the majority of China’s corporate reorganizations.2
* Lecturer at School of Law, University of Leeds, England; previously Research Fellow at the Centre for
Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia, School of Law, Singapore Management University, Singapore.
** Professor of Law, School of Law, University of South Australia, GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, 5001,
Australia, and Visiting Professor of Company Law, Durham Law School.
1. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the East Asian Law & Society Conference (Shanghai,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, 22 March 2013) and the 6th Insolvency Research Conference (London,
The Insolvency Service and University College London (UCL), 19 April 2012). Roman TOMASIC and
Zinian ZHANG, “From Global Convergence in China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 to Divergence
in Implementation: The Case of Corporate Reorganizations in China” (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 295 (noting that reorganization is only used for a small number of large companies in China).
2. Zhang has found that the debtor-in-possession model was only used in twenty-six percent of reported
Chinese reorganizations; see further: Zinian ZHANG, Corporate Reorganization Under the Enterprise
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These issues are examined through the use of empirical data collected from Zhejiang
province. Zhejiang was chosen for this detailed case study for the simple reason that
nearly a quarter of China’s corporate rescue cases between 2007 and 2010 were heard
in this province;3 as a result, Zhejiang offers a rich supply of data that allows
generalizations about the use of China’s new reorganization procedure to be made
more conﬁdently. Moreover, Zhang conducted twenty face-to-face interviews with
actors who were directly involved in Zhejiang corporate rescues.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Part I introduces the main
features of China’s new corporate rescue law; Part II reviews the literature; Part III
describes the methodology used here; Part IV sets forth the ﬁeldwork ﬁndings; and
Part V discusses the implications of these ﬁndings for debates regarding China’s new
corporate rescue regime. Our conclusion is to be found in Part VI.
i. an overview of china’s corporate
reorganization regime
China did not enact a modern corporate rescue law until 2006, when it promulgated
the EBL 2006 as its ﬁrst rescue-oriented bankruptcy law.4 While the previous law, the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation) (EBL 1986), contained
several provisions governing the reorganization of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) in
bankruptcy, these provisions were too simple to be recognized as a modern corporate
rescue regime.5 More importantly, as many Chinese bankruptcy scholars have noted,6
the EBL 1986’s over-simpliﬁed reorganization provisions were never used to
rehabilitate bankrupt SOEs.
To address these issues, China enacted the EBL 2006, which took effect on 1 June
2007. The EBL 2006 now comprehensively addresses the bankruptcy reorganization
procedure.7 Not only is it rescue-centred,8 but many pro-rescue mechanisms derived
from abroad have also been adopted. In particular, as mentioned by one of its
draftsmen, Professor Zou Hailin, the EBL 2006 has given prominence to the corporate
bankruptcy reorganization procedure by locating the chapter on reorganization before
Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China – The Relevance of Anglo-American Models for
China (PhD Thesis, Durham University, 2014) at 131.
3. Ibid at 115.
4. See Rebecca PARRY and Haizheng ZHANG, “China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and
Principles” (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113.
5. ShihuWANG, “WoguoGongsi ChongzhengZhiduDe JiantaoYu Jianyi (我国公司重整制度的检讨与建议)
[An Examination of China’s Corporate Reorganization Regime]” (2006) 28 Xiandai Faxue (现代法学)
[Modern Legal Science] 131 at 132 (noting that there was no modern corporate rescue regime in the EBL
1986).
6. Ibid at 133 (noting that the EBL 1986 had never been used to rescue troubled SOEs). See also Weiguo
WANG, “Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes in China, A Comparative Survey” (1998) 9 Australian
Journal of Corporate Law 234 at 238 (noting that the oversimpliﬁed rescue regime in the EBL 1986 was
not used at all).
7. See Charles D BOOTH, “The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally Over” (2008)
20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 275 at 300.
8. See John J RAPISARDI and Binghao ZHAO, “A Legal Analysis and Practical Application of the PRC
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law” (2010) 11 Business Law International 49 at 50.
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the chapters on conciliation and liquidation; this arguably reﬂects the lawmakers’
intent to use reorganization as the ﬁrst option for companies in difﬁculty.9 This
preference for reorganization can be seen in several areas of regulation. For instance,
the new law certainly makes ﬁling for reorganization easier: Article 7 allows both
debtor and creditor to ﬁle a petition with the court without advance governmental
approval, while Article 70 permits the debtor company, or any shareholder holding
more than ten percent of the company’s equity, to apply to the court to convert the
liquidation into a reorganization procedure even after liquidation has begun.10
Similarly, the EBL 2006 gives greater leverage to troubled companies and enables them
to enter into a safe harbour and keep aggressive creditors at bay: Article 2 stipulates
that a company voluntarily ﬁling for reorganization need not be bankrupt,11 in
contrast to the bankruptcy requirements for conciliation and liquidation procedures;12
and Articles 19 and 75 automatically impose a moratorium once the court accepts a
reorganization petition, staying the debt collection actions of all creditors, including
secured creditors,13 and creating a breathing space for the troubled debtor.
With regard to control of the company during the reorganization procedure,
Article 13 of the EBL 2006 authorizes the court to appoint an administrator, usually
a local-government-organized liquidation committee, a law ﬁrm, an accounting ﬁrm,
or a professional liquidating ﬁrm to take over the company’s affairs and properties
when the reorganization procedure commences. To help ensure that creditors’ views
are heeded, Article 22 allows a meeting of creditors to request the replacement of the
administrator if they have evidence that the latter is not even-handed or incompetent.
Article 73 allows the courts to transfer control of the company back to a debtor in
certain instances; if approved, the debtor will then administer the company’s affairs
and properties by itself, with the court-appointed administrator continuing to monitor
the rescue process in a supervisory capacity. However, where the debtor either does not
request to regain control or has his or her request rejected, the administrator will
continue to control and to manage the company.14
The reorganization is administered through an approved reorganization plan.
According to Article 79, a plan should be proposed within six months, although the
court has the discretion to grant an extension for a further three months. Article 80
9. Hailin ZOU, “Woguo Qiye Zaisheng Chenxu De Zhidu Fenxi He Yinyun (我国企业再生程序的制度分
析和适用) [China’s Corporate Rehabilitation System – Theories and Application]” (2007) 25 Zhongguo
Zhengfa Daxue Xuebao (中国政法大学学报) [Journal of China University of Political Science and Law]
48 at 50-51.
10. Ibid at 54 (arguing that the reason for allowing shareholders to ﬁle for reorganization is to protect
minority shareholders).
11. See Shujie QI, “WoguoXing Pochanfa Zhi Chongzhen Zhidu Ruogan Shupin (我国新破产法之重整制度
若干述评) [Corporate Reorganization Under the New Corporate Bankruptcy Law]” (2007) 1 Fujian
Faxue (福建法学) [Fujian Journal of Legal Science] 37 at 38.
12. Liming WANG, “Pochan Lifa Zhong De Ruogan Yinan Wengti Tantao (破产立法中的若干疑难问题探讨)
[Problems of Amending the Bankruptcy Law]” (2005) 3 Faxue (法学) [Legal Science] 3 at 11 [Wang,
“Amending the Bankruptcy Law”].
13. Xinxin WANG, “Xing Pochanfa Lifa Zongheng Tan (新破产立法纵横谈) [The New Bankruptcy Law]”
(2005) 4 Shoudu Shifan Daxue Xuebao (首都师范大学学报) [Journal of Capital Normal University
(Social Sciences Edition)] 34 at 40 [Wang, “The New Law”].
14. See Booth, supra note 7 at 303.
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requires that the plan be proposed by the debtor where the debtor-in-possession
approach is used or by the administrator if the administrator remains in control.15
Creditors are, surprisingly, not given a right to propose a plan. However, Article 82
grants them a right to vote on the plan, and requires the support of over half of the
company’s secured, employee, revenue, and unsecured creditors, who must also
represent over two-thirds of the amount of claims in each class of creditor, before it is
approved.16 Moreover, Article 85 makes clear that shareholders should also be
allowed to vote on the plan if their equity is either adjusted or cancelled.17
Once accepted by all classes of impaired parties through the vote, the plan can be
sent to the court for conﬁrmation.18 In cases where one or more classes of impaired
parties reject a plan, a “cram-down” procedure might also be requested so as to force
the reluctant parties to accept the plan, provided that the court ensures that three tests
are satisﬁed: the creditor-best-interest test, the fair and equitable test, and the feasibility
test.19 Where agreement is reached and the plan conﬁrmed by the court, the court will
then terminate the judicial reorganization procedure, and the company will be returned
to the debtor who is then required to implement the plan.20
ii. a review of previous research
A. Is a Company Rescue Worthwhile?
Two general criteria are recognized and used to assess whether a company deserves a
rescue effort.21 The ﬁrst is a company’s going concern value. Tene has argued that for a
company to be eligible for reorganization it should have going concern value that is
worth preserving.22 A company’s going concern value lies in its diverse relationships
with its stakeholders, and may be destroyed in the event of a piecemeal liquidation.23
This test, however, is not uncontroversial. For example, Baird and Rasmussen argue
that the going concern value that may exist within multiple relationships between a
company’s assets and its human resources will be worthless if it could not enable the
company to effectively compete with its rivals in the market, so that the going concern
value of a bankrupt company could not justify its reorganization if it could not be used
15. See Xinxin WANG, “Shilun Chongzhen Zhidu Zhi Lifa Wangshan (试论重整制度之立法完善)
[Improving the Corporate Reorganization Regime]” (2010) 10 Kunming Ligong Daxue Xuebao (昆明
理工大学学报) [Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology] 28 at 30.
16. See Xinxin WANG, “Practices of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006” (2009) 3 Journal of Law
Application 7 at 14.
17. See Wang, “Amending the Bankruptcy Law”, supra note 12 at 11.
18. Zhonghua Renming GongheguoQiye Pochanfa (中华人民共和国企业破产法) [The People’s Republic of
China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law] (2006), art 86 [EBL 2006].
19. Ibid, art 87.
20. Ibid, art 89.
21. Both are understood as originating in the US. See generally Charles Jordan TABB, “The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States” (1995) 3 America Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 5.
22. Omer TENE, “Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations” (2003) 19 Bankruptcy Developments Journal 287 at 295.
23. See generally Lynn M LOPUCKI, “The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and
Rasmussen’s The End of Bankruptcy” (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 645.
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to defeat its rivals and to generate a proﬁt for the company.24 Therefore, a second
criterion – the distress model – is also used.
Distress can be categorized as either ﬁnancial or economic in nature. While ﬁnancial
distress refers to the question of whether the company’s business operations are still viable
and can still generate a proﬁt after meeting operating costs, even though the company is
over-indebted for various reasons and becomes bankrupt, economic distress addresses
those companies whose business cannot yield a proﬁt and continually lose money. Baird
argues that only companies in ﬁnancial distress are suitable for reorganization, while
liquidation represents the only valid option for companies in economic distress.25
Distinguishing companies in ﬁnancial distress from those in economic distress is therefore
an essential ﬁrst step in the successful use of corporate reorganization. Nevertheless, there
are often many problems in applying this criterion in practice. For example, a ﬁnancially-
distressed company may still be liquidated in practice if it can generate a proﬁt but the
proﬁt is not as high as expected by its investors. Nor is it always easy to identify ﬁnancial
from economic distress. Indeed, Kahl argues that insufﬁcient information about a
company’s operations often leads to many wrong bankruptcy reorganization decisions.26
In view of the difﬁculties arising from the application of these two technical criteria,
some jurisdictions tend to broadly deﬁne eligibility for reorganization. For example,
the UK adopts a rather broadly-deﬁned, subjective principle to apply to any assessment
of a company’s eligibility for reorganization. McCormack notes that a company that is
subject to a reorganization (administration) application should have “a real prospect”
of being rescued.27 Obviously, the establishment of “a real prospect” is a subjective
exercise. Similarly, while Frisby argues that “insolvency law should address the
question of rescue selectively,” she offers no objective principles that could be referred
to in selecting UK companies that may be appropriate for reorganization.28 Even the
Insolvency Service, an ofﬁcial body regulating insolvency issues in the UK, adopts a
subjective view, noting that only “efﬁcient” companies that are in trouble may avail
themselves of the reorganization procedures29 but leaving the question about what
constitutes an efﬁcient organization unanswered. This somewhat open-ended criterion
is probably intended to provide more leeway to businesses themselves, which in turn
may lower the entry hurdles for companies seeking to utilize the company
reorganization procedures in the UK.
In China, two prevailing views are in circulation. The ﬁrst argues that whether
a company can enter the formal reorganization procedure depends on whether it has a
chance of surviving the distress that it is currently suffering. Upheld by scholars such as
24. See generally Douglas G BAIRD and Robert K RASMUSSEN, “The End of Bankruptcy” (2002)
55 Stanford Law Review 751.
25. Douglas G BAIRD, “Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms” (1998) 108 Yale Law Journal 573 at 580.
26. Matthias KAHL, “Economic Distress, Financial Distress, and Dynamic Liquidation” (2002) 57 The
Journal of Finance 135 at 136.
27. Gerald MCCORMACK, Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective (Glos: Edward Elgar,
2008) at 122.
28. Sandra FRISBY, “In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002” (2004) 67 The Modern Law
Review 247 at 248.
29. The Insolvency Service, AReview of Company Rescue and Business ReconstructionMechanisms: Report
by the Review Group (London: HMSO, 2000) (The 2000 Report) at para 24.
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Wang,30 this view posits that a company should face liquidation rather than
reorganization if it is unlikely to survive in the future, and appears to be somewhat
subjective and close to attitudes found in the UK. The second view argues that the
potentially huge costs suggest that reorganizations should only be used for large
companies, and that small and medium-sized companies ought to be excluded.
Advocated by those such as Li,31 this “reorganization-only-for-large-companies”
standard seems to be untenable. Indeed, two empirical studies from the US, the ﬁrst
undermining the belief that that liquidation costs less than reorganization and should
therefore be preferred,32 the second reporting that the vast majority of US companies in
reorganization are actually small to medium-sized and that only six percent of
companies in rescue could be identiﬁed as large or held over $100 million in assets,33
demonstrate the controversy behind this view. Both studies suggest that, while it
may still be premature to assert that China’s infrequent use of corporate
reorganizations so far is attributable to the “reorganization-only-for-large-
companies” view, reorganization should be open to all companies, regardless of size.
B. Investigation into the Small Number of Corporate
Reorganizations in China
Despite the new law, reorganizations remain rare in China. One source reports that
China’s courts only handled about 105 corporate reorganization cases in the ﬁrst three
years following the implementation of the EBL 2006, citing data revealed in a Beijing
lawyer’s conference presentation.34 This ﬁgure remains questionable, as the lawyer did
not disclose the source of his data, nor did the analysts go on to lookmore closely at the
reasons for the small number of corporate reorganizations. However, other studies
have also shown an awareness of the fact that the new corporate rescue law was
infrequently used, usually without quantifying their assessment. Wang, for example,
offers no quantitative support for his assertion that corporate reorganization is
infrequently used in China, relying instead on a series of personal observations.35
Similarly, Han and He have noted that the new rescue law has not been well
implemented, but do not support their conclusion with empirical evidence.36
30. LimingWANG, “Several Issues ofAmendingChina’s Bankruptcy Law” (2002) 5ChinaLegal Science78 at83.
31. Yongjun LI, “Xing Pochanfa Jiaodian Wenti Toushi (新破产法焦点问题透视) [Focal Problems of the
New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law]” (2006) 10 Caikuai Xuexi (财会学习) [Accounting Studies] 14 at 16.
32. Arturo BRIS, Ivo WELCH, and Ning ZHU, “The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus
Chapter 11 Reorganization” (2006) 61 The Journal of Finance 1253 at 1301.
33. Elizabeth WARREN and Jay Lawrence WESTBROOK, “The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the
Critics” (2009) 107Michigan Law Review 603 at 609.
34. Shuguang LI and Zuofa WANG, “Zhongguo Pochanfa Shishi Sannian De Shizhen Fenxi (中国破产法实
施三年的实证分析) [An Empirical Study of the Implementation of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
During the First Three Years]” (2011) 22 Zhongguo Zhenfa Daxue Xuebao (中国政法大学学报) [The
Journal of China University of Political Science and Law] 58 at 60 (this ﬁgure was derived from data
revealed in a conference presentation by a Beijing lawyer) [Li and Wang, “First Three Years”].
35. See Xinxin WANG, “Lun Pochan Anjian Shouli Nan Wenti De Jiejue (论破产案件受理难问题的解决)
[Difﬁculties in Commencing Corporate Bankruptcy Processes in China]” (2011) 3 Falu Shiyun (法律适用)
[Journal of Law Application] 29 [Wang, “Difﬁculties of Commencing”].
36. Changyin HAN and Huan HE, “Pochan Jiexian De Lifa Gongneng Wenti (破产界限的立法功能问题)
[Bankruptcy Tests and Practices]” (2013) 2 Zhenzhi Yu Falu (政治与法律) [Politics and Law] 2.
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Previously, we reported on a detailed empirical study regarding the number of
corporate reorganizations in China, indicating that 105 enterprises entered the corporate
reorganization procedure in China between June 2007 and November 2010.37
Interestingly, this ﬁgure of 105 reorganization cases parallels the ﬁndings reported by Li
and Wang. However, our earlier study did not take steps to further investigate why the
new rescue law was not widely used in China. This article aims to address this gap.
C. Control in Reorganization
With respect to control in corporate reorganizations, Booth notes that there are two
typical models in use worldwide: the debtor-in-possession approach (mainly used in
the US) and the practitioner-in-possession approach or the administrator-
in-possession approach (used in the UK and some other countries). China has
adopted a hybrid approach, under which the practitioner-in-possession38model serves
as the default option under the EBL 2006, but which can be converted to the debtor-
in-possession approach at the request of the debtor and subject to court approval.39
As the name suggests, the debtor-in-possession model leaves the debtor in charge of
the company after it has entered the formal bankruptcy reorganization procedure. In
contrast, the practitioner-in-possession model requires that the debtor (especially its
directors and managers) be replaced by an outside practitioner, usually a qualiﬁed
insolvency professional; therefore, the practitioner-in-possession model will lead to the
automatic resignation or displacement of the debtor’s management.40
In explaining why US companies prefer the debtor-in-possession approach, Roache
offers four reasons that may help to better understand this: ﬁrst, the debtor’s experience
and information in running the company are vital for an effective rescue; second, it is
more costly to install an outside thirty party to administer the rescue process, such as an
insolvency practitioner, as they are not familiar with the company; third, the debtor
would be motivated to work harder in the rescue procedure because of its own interests;
and ﬁnally, the debtor may be more comfortable using the reorganization law since it can
remain in control of the process.41 Importantly, the debtor-in-possession model is not
guaranteed in all US corporate (Chapter 11) reorganizations, as an outside trustee may
still be appointed if the company’s distress is caused by fraud.42Moreover, evenwhere the
debtor-in-possession model is applied, the debtor remains subject to ﬁduciary duties and
will be under heavy scrutiny and supervision from both the court and the creditors.43
37. Tomasic and Zhang, supra note 1 at 311.
38. This article uses the practitioner-in-possession and administrator-in-possession model interchangeably.
39. Booth, supra note 7 at 303.
40. See generally Gerard MCCORMACK, “Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American
Evaluation” (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 515 [McCormack, “Control and
Corporate Rescue”].
41. John T ROACHE, “The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession” (1993) 1993 University of
Illinois Law Review 133 at 140-141.
42. See Michael BRADLEY andMichael ROSENZWEIG, “The Untenable Case for Chapter 11” (1992) 101
Yale Law Journal 1043 at 1044.
43. See generally Raymond T NIMMER and Richard B FEINBERG, “Chapter 11 Business Governance:
FiduciaryDuties, Business Judgement, Trustee and Exclusivity” (1989) 6BankruptcyDevelopments Journal 1.
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With regard to the UK’s practitioner-in-possession approach, McCormack argues
that there are a host of considerations that have led the country to choose a
management-replacement regime. For example, it is widely held in Britain that failing
business managers should not be allowed to continue to run failed businesses, that a
group of UK qualiﬁed insolvency practitioners is better equipped to run bankrupt
businesses with impartiality and integrity, and that bank-centred lending markets in
the UK make debtor companies quite weak before their main creditors, such as
powerful banks; he also asserts that path dependency or the force of convention might
also help to explain prevailing attitudes in the UK.44 However, the harsh treatment of
debtors under the practitioner-in-possession model has given to debtors is often seen to
be detrimental to effective rescue. Armour and others have used this point to argue that
the UK’s corporate rescue law may eventually move more closely towards the US’s
debtor-in-possession approach.45
Ultimately, it may be overly simplistic to label the US’s Chapter 11 procedure as the
debtor-in-possession approach and the UK’s administration procedure as the
practitioner-in-possession approach. Finch has suggested that doing this has polarized
views, and that this has resulted in a failure to fully and adequately appreciate the roles
played by other parties such as creditors and directors in corporate rescues.46 Indeed, in a
process that looks more like a bargaining platform in which all interested parties table
their claims and pursue their own agendas, it would seem that creditors repeatedly play a
decisive role. McCormack uses this point to argue that there has in fact been a functional
convergence of control in corporate rescues, as creditors in both the UK and the US are
able to substantially determine the fate of troubled debtors under their respective
corporate reorganization procedures.47 In other words, regardless of whether the debtor-
in-possession or the practitioner-in-possession approach is used, creditors will always
have a big say regarding the outcomes of rescues.
In terms of corporate rescues in China, Wang believes that, in principle, the debtor
should be allowed to remain in control after the formal rescue procedure has begun;
this is both because the debtor’s experience and information is vital to ensuring that the
company’s business needs are met, and because lawyer and accountant administrators
lack the expertise to turn troubled companies around.48 Wang also emphasizes that
China’s version of the debtor-in-possession approach should be placed under the
supervision of a court-appointed administrator, so as to ﬁll the assumed supervision
gap left by the US debtor-in-possession approach and prevent the debtor
from abusing its control.49 And he stresses that experience shows that if the
44. McCormack, “Control and Corporate Rescue”, supra note 40 at 521.
45. John ARMOUR, Brian R CHEFFINS, and David A SKEEL, Jr, “Corporate Ownership Structure and the
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom” (2002) 55 Vanderbilt Law Review
1699 at 1782.
46. Vanessa FINCH, “Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue” (2005) 25 Legal Studies 374 at 375.
47. McCormack, “Control and Corporate Rescue”, supra note 40 at 544.
48. XinxinWANG, “Xing Pochanfa De Tupo (新破产法的突破) [Innovations in the New Bankruptcy Law]”
(2006) 2 Faren (法人) [Legal Entity Journal] 20.
49. Weiguo WANG, “Xing Pochanfa Caoan Yu Gongsi Faren Zhili (新破产法草案与公司法人治理) [The
Draft of the New Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Corporate Governance]” (2005) 2 Faxuejia (法学家)
[The Jurists] 5 at 7 [Wang, “The Draft”].
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administrator-in-possession approach is used, the court should consider appointing
management professionals as administrators rather than lawyers or accountants, who
have often been proven to be incompetent in their roles.50
One distinctive feature of corporate rescue in China is that Article 24 of the EBL
2006 also allows the court to rely on an older method and appoint a local-government-
organized liquidation committee as the administrator. However, Wang argues that
debates over draft versions of the EBL 2006 in the China’s National People’s Congress
show that this provision was only retained in order to deal with the bankruptcy
reorganization of SOEs.51 This view is also held by Li and Wang, who believe that the
use of liquidation committees is reserved as a transitional mechanism for the “policy”
bankruptcy of SOEs so as to bridge the old EBL 1986 with the new EBL 2006.52
All this suggests that a consensus among academics seems to be emerging on the
issue of control in Chinese corporate reorganizations. According to this emerging
agreement, the debtor-in-possession approach will represent the norm rather than the
exception, and that a third party administrator would be appointed only in cases where
the debtor has committed fraud or has engaged in dishonest activities before
bankruptcy. Moreover, only the reorganization of an SOE would permit the
appointment of a local-government-organized liquidation committee as administrator.
D. Control of Corporate Reorganizations in China
Li and Wang note that most of the existing listed company reorganizations in China
have involved the appointment of a local-government-organized liquidation committee
as the administrator, and that such committees were also used in some non-listed
company reorganizations;53 while they indicate that China’s newly qualiﬁed
insolvency practitioners were often not hired to do the job, they fail either to
quantify the number of administrator appointments from both local-government-
organized liquidation committees and from qualiﬁed insolvency practitioners or to
investigate sufﬁciently whether and to what extent the debtor-in-possession model was
subsequently used. Wang also observes that in many corporate reorganizations courts
have appointed administrators from local-government-organized liquidation
committees rather than qualiﬁed insolvency practitioners, but does not provide any
data supporting his observation, let alone to further survey the use of the debtor-
in-possession model.54 And, again, our own 2012 paper reports the statistical results
concerning the administrator appointment from liquidation committees and
insolvency practitioners, as well as the use of the debtor-in-possession, but does not
investigate the causes of the phenomenon.55
50. Xinxin WANG, “Lun Pochan Guanliren Zhidu Wanshan De Ruogan Wenti (论破产管理人制度完善的
若干问题) [Improving the Insolvency Practitioner System]” (2010) 9 Fazhi Yanjiu (法治研究) [Legal
Research] 14 at 15.
51. Wang, “The New Law”, supra note 13 at 39.
52. Li and Wang, supra note 34 at 62.
53. Ibid at 67.
54. Wang, “The Draft”, supra note 49 at 15.
55. Tomasic and Zhang, supra note 1 at 311-315.
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To sum up, then, three main points can be made from the above review of the
literature. First, given the way in which it is designed, corporate reorganization should
only be open to companies that have a going concern value which is above their
liquidation value and that are ﬁnancially rather than economically distressed. Second,
the debtor-in-possession approach is intended to be the primary control model in
China’s corporate reorganization procedures. Finally, there has not been enough
research into why China’s new corporate rescue law is not frequently used as well as
why most of the existing corporate reorganizations have preferred to use the
practitioner-in-possession instead of the expected debtor-in-possession approach.
Before presenting the ﬁndings from our Zhejiang case study in this regard, the next part
outlines the methodology used to collect the data on these issues.
iii. methodology
In seeking to better understand the implementation of China’s new corporate rescue
law, twenty corporate reorganization cases56 that were accepted by Zhejiang courts
between 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2011 were examined; they are set out in
Table 1. These twenty cases involved the rescue of the thirty-ﬁve companies, since, in
some cases, several companies in a company group were consolidated into one
reorganization procedure.57
The data was collected in two stages. In the ﬁrst, the cases were identiﬁed and drawn
from the online sources publicized by newspapers and relevant legal institutions
including courts and law ﬁrms. Almost all Chinese newspapers have online versions,
making data collection much easier; and many law ﬁrms and courts also have their
Internet websites reporting some cases that are deemed to be very valuable and
important. But the difﬁculty arising during this stage was that the data collected was
likely to be incomplete, largely because some information sought for the current
analysis was not of sufﬁcient interest to the agencies concerned; much of this missing
information had to be obtained through ﬁeldwork.
Thus, in the second stage, interviews with twenty people who were involved in
seventeen out of these twenty reorganizations were conducted by Zhang in Zhejiang
from January to February 2012. Not only did these interviewees help answer the
unresolved questions, they also provided detailed information about the cases, as
examined in greater detail in this article. In particular, the reorganization plans of
sixteen reorganizations in either electronic format or hard copy were generously
provided by these interviewees. As Table 2 shows, these interviewees comprised eight
56. The reorganization case of Zhejiang Wei’er Trade Limited and its four subsidiaries, which was accepted
by Yongkang Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang on 2 September 2009, was not included, because this case
was not found by this study due to the limit of the methodology.
57. This table is based on the data collected by Zinian Zhang in 2012-13. Most of these cases were also
mentioned in an ofﬁcial report issued by Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court. For western scholars, there
are two databases, LawinfoChina and Westlaw China, which collect a huge number of China’s court
cases. Zhang tried to use these two databases to verify the collected cases in Zhejiang. Unfortunately,
largely because only a small proportion of China’s court cases is included in these two databases, these
Zhejiang cases could not be found there.
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Table 1. Zhejiang Corporate Reorganization Cases
(Accepted between 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2011)
Company Court
Date of acceptance
(yyyy/mm/dd) Miscellaneous
1 Haina Science Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2007/09/14 Listed company
2 Dadi Paper Fuyang Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/06/01
3 Hualun Group Fuyang Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/06/01 Consolidated with its ﬁve subsidiary companies
4 Guangsai Energy Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2008/05/20
5 Nanwang Group Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2008/05/20
6 International Hotel Xiaoshan Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/07/01
7 Yijiaxiang Food Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/07/15
8 Nongji Manufacture Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/07/15
9 Jiamei Travel Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/07/15
10 Medier Food Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/07/15
11 Jinxing Trust Jinghua Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/10/26
12 Huachen Development Beilun Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/04/29
13 Tianting Paper Pujiang Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/09/01
14 Yalun Paper Longyou Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/06/22 Converted to liquidation
15 Huatai Oil Putuo Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/01/08
16 Zonghen Group Shaoxing Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang 2009/06/12 Consolidated with its ﬁve subsidiary companies
17 Jiande Steel Jiande Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2010/10/09
18 Ouweibao Retail Putuo Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2011/08/29 Consolidated with its two subsidiary companies
and converted to liquidation eventually
19 Hengyu Ship-Building Putuo Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2011/10/21 Consolidated with its three subsidiary companies
and pending at the time of writing
20 Yongji Ship-Building Putuo Lower People’s Court, Zhejiang 2011/11/29 Pending at the time of writing
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lawyers, two accountants, three judges, ﬁve creditors or their representatives, one
debtor, and one government ofﬁcial.
All interviews took place in the ofﬁces of the interviewees, and no electronic recorder
was used. So as to better preserve conﬁdentiality, no third party was present during the
interviews. The notes initially taken byZhang inChinesewere later translated into English.
iv. findings
A. Company Dissolution, Bankruptcy, and Reorganization
Rates in Zhejiang
To gain a deeper understanding of the use of the enterprise bankruptcy law in
Zhejiang, three percentages were calculated. The ﬁrst was the annual company
dissolution rate, which was generated by dividing the annual number of company
dissolutions by the number of companies registered at the start of each year; this rate
reﬂects market forces in culling weak businesses. The second was the annual company
bankruptcy rate, which was generated by dividing the annual number of company
bankruptcies (including all bankruptcy reorganization, compromise, and liquidation
procedures) by the annual number of company dissolutions; this rate reﬂects the extent
to which the corporate bankruptcy law as a whole has been applied. Lastly, the third
was the annual company reorganization rate, which was calculated by dividing the
number of corporate reorganizations by that of company dissolutions, and is used to
determine the extent to which the bankruptcy reorganization procedure is used.
By applying the above methods to the ﬁgures reported in Table 3 below, it can be
calculated that in Zhejiang the annual company dissolution rate was 9.56 percent in
2007, 9.43 percent in 2008, 8.06 percent in 2009, 6.69 percent in 2010, and 6.26
percent in 2011, with a mean company dissolution rate of 7.84 percent over the
four-year period; the annual company bankruptcy rate was 0.05 percent in 2007,
0.06 percent in 2008, 0.07 percent in 2009, 0.07 percent in 2010, and 0.14 percent in
2011, with a mean company bankruptcy rate of 0.06 percent over the entire period;
and the annual company reorganization rate was 0.0017 percent in 2007, 0.0032
percent in 2008, 0.0122 percent in 2009, 0.0134 percent in 2010, and 0.0056 percent
in 2011, with a mean corporate reorganization rate of 0.0070 percent.
Table 2. Reorganization Interviewees in Zhejiang*
Interviewees Number of Interviewees Number of Cases Involved
Lawyer 8 13
Accountant 2 3
Creditor 5 5
Judge 3 13
Debtor 1 1
Government Ofﬁcial 1 1
* Interviews were conducted in Zhejiang from January to February 2012
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While the ﬁgures in Table 3 illustrate the situation in Zhejiang, an international
comparison can identify the gaps Zhejiang may need to bridge in the future. Therefore,
corresponding ﬁgures from England and Wales and the US were also obtained from
ofﬁcial sources in each country. Table 4 gives the related statistics of England and
Wales; by using the same methods, it can be determined that, during the same period
between 2007 and 2011, England and Wales’ mean company dissolution rate was
12.76 percent, the mean company bankruptcy rate was 8.40 percent, and the mean
company reorganization rate was 1.36 percent. In regard to ﬁgures from the US,
because of the statistical interval, the US Census Bureau had not produced the national
numbers of companies and dissolutions for the years 2010 and 2011 at the time of
writing. To address this, the ﬁgures between 2005 and 2009 were used as substitutes;
these are shown in Table 5. These numbers generated a mean company dissolution rate
was 10.57 percent, a mean company bankruptcy rate was 6.14 percent, and a mean
company reorganization rate was 1.23 percent.
The contrast between these three jurisdictions is further illustrated and compared in
Figure 1. In regard to the company dissolution rate, clearly, there is a great similarity
between all these three jurisdictions – about ten percent of companies exited the market
annually, indicating that market forces generally function similarly in culling inefﬁcient
companies, no matter where these companies are located. Zhejiang’s company
dissolution rate of 7.84 percent is slightly lower than that in England andWales and the
US, and this might be attributed to the higher economic growth rates in China: between
2007 and 2011, China’s annual GDP growth rate was 10.54 percent, whilst the UK’s
growth rate (England and Wales included) was 0.28 percent, with the US’s growth at
only 0.52 percent.58
With respect to the annual company bankruptcy and reorganization rates, however,
similarities only exist between England and Wales and the US, where about ﬁve to ten
percent of dissolved companies entered bankruptcy procedures, and approximately
Table 3. Company Dissolutions, Bankruptcies, and Reorganizations in Zhejiang
(2007-2011)
Year
Number of Registered
Companies
Number of
Companies Dissolved
Number of Corporate
Bankruptcies
Number of Corporate
Reorganizations
2007 608,871 58,222 35 1
2008 666,624 62,841 42 2
2009 711,701 57,372 41 7
2010 782,639 52,378 36 7
2011 862,395 53,993 77 3
Sources: The Zhejiang Provincial Company Registration Ofﬁce, The Zhejiang Supreme
People’s Court, Siyuan Think-Tank, Beijing, and Zinian Zhang’s PhD Data Collection.
58. The GDP growth rates were obtained from the World Bank statistics. See The World Bank, “GDP
Growth (Annual %)”, online: The World Bank < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
KD.ZG> .
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one percent of dissolved companies chose to reorganize in an effort to remain in
business. Both ﬁgures contrast sharply with those from Zhejiang. While data from
the US would suggest that roughly 6.14 percent of dissolved companies in Zhejiang
would rely on bankruptcy procedures to tackle debt problems at a time when they
were dissolved, in fact only 0.08 percent of them actually did this. Indeed, the
Zhejiang courts only handled 1.30 percent of corporate bankruptcies, which are liable
to be dealt with annually as a whole under the EBL 2006. In other words, the Zhejiang
courts only fulﬁlled 1.30 percent of their corporate bankruptcy trial duties, which are
legally required by the statute. Apparently, the vast majority of companies that were
bankrupt did not use – or could not access – formal bankruptcy procedures in
Zhejiang. The same conclusion can also be drawn in regard to the company
reorganization rate: the Zhejiang courts only fulﬁlled 0.57 percent of the corporate
reorganization trial duties imposed upon them by the EBL 2006.
One may ask whether the low company bankruptcy rate in Zhejiang is because the
majority of dissolved Zhejiang companies were ﬁnancially healthy and able to fully pay
their debts at the time of dissolution, so that no bankruptcy procedures were needed.
Table 4. Company Dissolutions, Bankruptcies, and Reorganizations in England and
Wales (2007-2011)
Year
Number of Registered
Companies
Number of
Companies Dissolved
Number of Corporate
Bankruptcies*
Number of Corporate
Reorganizations**
2007 2.10m 214,500 22,490 4,016
2008 2.41m 223,200 22,928 3,139
2009 2.54m 288,900 29,338 5,876
2010 2.58m 489,000 29,339 4,380
2011 2.44m 324,000 25,207 3,569
*All bankruptcy procedures under the Insolvency Act 1986.
**Reorganization includes administration and company voluntary arrangement in England and
Wales. Source: The UK Insolvency Service
Table 5. Company Dissolutions, Bankruptcies, and Reorganizations in the US
(2005-2009)*
Year
Number of Registered
Companies
Number of
Companies Dissolved
Number of Corporate
Bankruptcies
Number of Corporate
Reorganizations
2005 5.19m 492,686 31,952 6,250
2006 5.23m 532,987 35,292 5,701
2007 5.29m 560,312 21,960 4,668
2008 5.24m 566,379 30,741 6,274
2009 5.09m 600,109 49,091 10,846
* In the US, they use the concept “ﬁrm” rather than “company”. For the sake of convenience
and consistency, the concept company is used in this article. Sources: The US Census Bureau
and the US Courts
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This assumption is unlikely to be the case. According to a report released by the
Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, we can estimate that in Zhejiang at least 20.10
percent of dissolved companies were unable to pay their debts and were ﬁnancially
bankrupt but did not enter bankruptcy procedures in the ﬁve-year period surveyed.59
The real situation would probably be far worse.
Moreover, some may ask whether a higher corporate bankruptcy or reorganization
rate leads to a more efﬁcient bankruptcy system. This is probably wrong. Bankruptcy
procedures must step in as far as companies are unable to pay the debts when dissolved;
by this token, in theory, the bankruptcy rate must remain at zero in the situation where
all companies can still fully honour their debt upon being dissolved, but this assumed
situation is in reality non-existent.
This strikingly similar contrast can also be drawn if comparing Zhejiang
with England and Wales regarding both the annual bankruptcy and reorganization
rates, the Zhejiang courts being largely paralysed in their handling of corporate
bankruptcy and reorganization cases. Therefore, it was very rare for the new
Chinese corporate reorganization law to be used in Zhejiang, even though
Zhejiang has clearly taken the lead in using this law when compared with
other provinces in China. It is therefore legitimate to ask why the reorganization
7.84
0.08 0.007
12.76
8.4
1.36
10.57
6.14
1.23
Company Dissolution 
Rate (%)
Company Bankruptcy 
Rate (%)
Company Reorganization
Rate (%)
Zhejiang England and Wales US
Figure 1. Company Dissolution, Bankruptcy, and Reorganization Rates in Zhejiang, England
and Wales, and the US.
59. According to a report of Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, in Wenzhou, one of eleven prefectures of
Zhejiang, there were 3,122 judgement debtor companies which were unable to pay their judgement debts
from 2010 to 2013, and the local Wenzhou courts had to drop the judgment enforcement procedures
because there were not company assets which could be found. In other words, these companies were
bankrupt, but the bankruptcy procedures were not used, and these companies just disappeared without
being formally investigated through bankruptcy processes. Arithmetically, it could be estimated that there
might be about 11,447 companies ((3,122× 11)∕3) that were dissolved and were bankrupt in Zhejiang as
a whole annually during this three-year period, but they did not enter the formal bankruptcy procedures.
Given the annual 56,961 company dissolutions in Zhejiang as shown in Table 3, the real company
bankruptcy rate should be at least 20.10 percent. See The Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, “2012
Zhejiang Fayuan Qiye Pochan Shenpan Baogao (2012年浙江法院企业破产审判报告) [2012 Report on
Trying Corporate Bankruptcies]” (6 May 2013), online: Xing Lang < http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/
blog_45c1e92a0101mxyd.html#commonComment> .
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provisions of the EBL 2006 have been so little used. We will explore this question in
the next section.
B. Obstacles to Entering into the Corporate Reorganization Procedure
Three major parties – court, debtor, and creditor – play decisive roles in determining
the shape of corporate reorganization activity in Zhejiang. This is especially true with
regard to the commencement of company reorganizations. The concerns of these three
parties regarding the company reorganization procedure may largely explain the
factors that hinder the use of the new law. This section reports the concerns raised by
each of these three parties respectively.
1. Difﬁculties faced by the courts
With a provincial population of 55million, Zhejiang has 102 law courts, including the
Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, eleven intermediate people’s courts, and ninety
lower people’s courts.60 In theory, all 102 courts can handle corporate reorganizations.
But, the fact that only twenty corporate reorganizations occurred between 2007 and
2011 means that the vast majority of Zhejiang courts never accepted corporate
reorganization petitions during this period.
The scarcity of corporate reorganizations can largely be attributed to the hesitation
of courts in accepting reorganization ﬁlings. One judge interviewed for this research
mentioned that when a corporate reorganization petition is lodged in his court, it is
always treated as a very sensitive issue, and the ﬁnal decision to accept it would usually
be made by the court’s deputy president.61 This pattern can be understood by reference
to the context within which Chinese courts operate.
When Chinese courts face ordinary commercial litigation such as a contract
dispute, it is the court’s registry which usually assesses and decides whether to
accept the ﬁling. However, in some cases deemed difﬁcult to handle, such as an
administrative litigation where a government department is sued, the registry tends to
refer the ﬁling to the director of an adjudicating chamber to assess its merits and to
decide whether it can be accepted. In exceptional cases, it is the deputy president in
charge of trial affairs or the court’s top decision-making body, the judicial committee,
who decides whether to accept an individual case ﬁling. Since a corporate
reorganization ﬁling is considered to be exceptional, and without a decision from
the top, the registry would not accept it. In refusing to accept corporate reorgani-
zation ﬁlings, courts have their own internal concerns, which we will now turn to
consider.
(a)Manpower: Asked why courts in Zhejiang were so hesitant in accepting corporate
reorganization ﬁlings, nearly half of the interviewees, including lawyers and judges,
said that courts do not have enough judges to deal with corporate reorganization
60. See The Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, “Zhejiang Fayuan Jieshao” (浙江法院介绍) [An Introduction
to the Zhejiang Courts], online: The Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court < http://www.zjcourt.cn/
20060320000004/> .
61. Personal Interview, Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
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matters if all such petitions are accepted without restrictions.62 Indeed, most Chinese
courts are known to be understaffed. As in other provinces, Zhejiang does not have
special bankruptcy courts;63 as a result, corporate bankruptcies, including
reorganizations, are assigned to the second civil chambers of courts. Judges in all
chambers are already saddled with too many lawsuits, and one ofﬁcial report states
that it is not unusual for a judge in Zhejiang to handle over 200 cases a year,64meaning
that a judge must organize and sit in at least one court hearing and write at least one
verdict every working day. As a result, judges do not want to be bothered with more
cases, especially time-consuming corporate bankruptcies. It should also be noted that
after the EBL 2006 took effect in 2007 there was no facilitative increase in the number
of judges in Zhejiang courts.
Apart from the deﬁciency in the number of judges, one of the judges interviewed
emphasized that most existing judges are not experienced and skilled in dealing
with corporate bankruptcies including reorganizations;65 this is probably true.66
Two factors may have contributed to this incapacity on the part of the judges. First,
Zhejiang judges are not speciﬁcally trained in terms of handling corporate bankruptcy
and reorganization, and no special training courses have been developed for
judges in Zhejiang since the EBL 2006 came into force. Similarly, although many
lawyers and accountants were ofﬁcially designated as insolvency practitioners in
Zhejiang in 2007, no tailored training courses or qualiﬁcation exams were required.67
Second, most Zhejiang judges have neither had prior bankruptcy cases to gain
experience from nor gained relevant experience from prior legal practice. Indeed,
only forty-six corporate bankruptcy cases a year are heard by Zhejiang’s 102
courts (see Table 3 above), suggesting that more than half of the Zhejiang courts have
not had a single corporate bankruptcy case to gain experience from. Together,
these two factors seems to create a vicious circle, where the lack of experience makes
judges hesitate in handling corporate bankruptcies, while the absence of prior legal
experience in practice further undermines their conﬁdence in handling reorgani-
zation cases.
62. Personal Interview, Administrator 3, a lawyer, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
63. In the 1990s, foreign experts advised China to establish a special bankruptcy court system to deal with
corporate bankruptcies, but this proposal was rejected. See generally Terence C. HALLIDAY, “The
Making of China’s Corporate Bankruptcy Law” (2007) Oxford Series in Law, Justice and Society 2 at 7.
64. In 2012, Zhejiang courts as a whole handled 148 cases per judge. See Jianhua YU andHuanliangMENG,
“Zhejiang Fayuan Banan Faguan Renjun Jieanliang Wei Quanguo Pingjunsu Liangbei (浙江法院办案法
官人均结案量为全国平均数两倍) [Zhejiang Judges Handled Double the National Average Number of
Cases]” Zhejiang Fayuan Xinwen Wang (浙江法院新闻网) [Zhejiang Courts Net] (18 January 2012),
online: Zhejiang Courts Net < http://court.gmw.cn/public/detail.php?id=83910> .
65. Two personal interviews: Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012,
and Administrator 3, a lawyer, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
66. See also AndrewMCGINTY and VC LEOW, “China’s Insolvency Law Two Years On: Are Government-
Driven Restructurings the New Trend” (2009) 11 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law
689.
67. In January 2013, Zinian Zhang had a talk with Mr Hongzhu Zhang, the director of the second civil
chamber of the Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, who is in charge of designating all insolvency
practitioners in Zhejiang. During the talk, Mr Zhang conﬁrmed that no training courses or qualiﬁcation
exams were made.
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In brief, most courts in Zhejiang do not have a sufﬁcient number of judges to deal
with bankruptcy proceedings, nor do they have the expertise needed to handle
corporate reorganizations properly. In other words, they are not ready – or not
adequately equipped – to fulﬁl the duties imposed by the new reorganization law.
Nevertheless, by comparison to these internal difﬁculties, greater challenges might have
come from outside the court system.
(b) Government support: Many interviewees believed that the unwillingness of courts
to accept corporate reorganizations is due to the lack of government support.68 Unlike
the handling of day-to-day cases, the court needs administrative services or
cooperation from many government departments when dealing with a corporate
reorganization case. For example, the revenue authorities need to agree to provide tax-
approved receipts to the company if the company’s business operations continue
during the reorganization procedure, and the utility authorities should not cut water
and electricity supplies simply on the grounds that the company has unpaid bills. In
reality, however, courts alone are unable to persuade local government departments to
cooperate or to facilitate these aspects of corporate reorganization procedures.
Law courts are weak institutions in China’s present political system. One judge
interviewed in this study revealed that in his experience “local government departments
will not listen to us unless the local government is ofﬁcially involved in an individual
bankruptcy case.”69 This judge gave an example to demonstrate the difﬁculties that the
court faced when handling a reorganization procedure.70 In a case supervized by him, the
local police department played a key role in investigating the company’s assets, because the
lawyer administrator was denied access to the company’s asset records held by banks and
many government agencies; without the police investigation, it was impossible even to
know the whereabouts of the company’s key assets, let alone to reorganize the company’s
business. However, this judge interviewee emphasized that in that case the local police
department was actively involved mainly because the police were ordered by the local
government to do so and that, in this case, the deputy mayor of the city had chaired a
committee in support of the reorganization process.
However, the fact is that government support is not always available to assist courts.
Local governments have the discretion, and not an obligation, to back individual
reorganizations handled by courts. One lawyer interviewee held a similar view.71 This
lawyer disclosed that, in the reorganization case in which he was involved, the court
had asked for and received a written guarantee from the local district government
promising to ensure that all government departments would provide effective and
efﬁcient administrative services if needed,72 adding that the court was not conﬁdent in
accepting the ﬁling without the government’s guarantee.
68. Personal Interview, Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Personal Interview, Administrator 3, a lawyer, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
72. See Haiqing TANG and Yinghua SHI, “Mingyin Qiye Pochan Chongzhen Zhi Sifa Tansuo (民营企业破
产重整之司法探索) [Private Company Reorganization]” (2011) 12 Fazhi Yanjiu (法治研究) [Legal
Research] 102 and 105 (noting that the government guarantee in writing was obtained in that case).
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(c)Mass petitions by employees or creditors: Most interviewees believed that courts most
worry about potential mass petitions.73 This could only be appreciated in the unique
context of China, where it is well documented that most Chinese courts try to distance
themselves from categories of cases that are very likely to generate protests by refusing to
accept them.74 Corporate reorganizations are highly related to mass-petitions; this article
found that mass petitions occurred in at least eleven out of the twenty Zhejiang corporate
reorganization cases studied here, and that in each case themass petition had beenmade by
unpaid employees. Assembling in large numbers, the unpaid employees laid their
grievances before the local governments, probably because Article 85 of theChina Labour
Law 2005 holds the local government liable for enforcing the labour law and ensuring that
employees are paid under their labour contracts. (Fortunately such mass petitions all took
place before the commencement of these reorganizations; otherwise, the judges in charge
of these cases would have faced enormous pressure.)
The problem is that, in spite of governmental support in all of these cases, the judges
were still very anxious, or highly vigilant, about the reorganization procedure. This is
probably out of fears about potential protests.One lawyer interviewee disclosed that about
800 riot police ofﬁcers were deployed to monitor the creditors’ meeting in a case that he
was involved with so as to pre-empt protests by the creditors, even though only 600
creditors or so attended the meeting.75 Similarly, a second lawyer interviewee in another
city mentioned that each creditor was physically ﬂanked with two police ofﬁcers during a
meeting in which he was involved.76 In other cities in Zhejiang, many interviewees also
noted that riot police were present at the creditors’ meetings. All these measures were
intentionally made to avoid or suppress any form of protests. Some creditors complained
that they were in fact intimidated when attending creditors meetings.77
2. Unwillingness of debtors to reorganize in courts
Ideally, reorganizations are more successful where they are initiated by the debtors
themselves, since they have the requisite knowledge and experience gained from
running their own businesses. In Zhejiang, however, it is rare to see debtors voluntarily
ﬁling for reorganization.
One interviewee explained that most debtor companies try to avoid in-court
reorganizations for fear of losing control to third parties. This is because under Article
13 of the EBL 2006 the entry into the formal bankruptcy reorganization procedure
leads to the automatic resignation of the debtor’s directors and management team, an
unacceptable outcome for most of a company’s ofﬁcers.78 And although Article 73 of
73. Personal Interview, Administrator 3, a lawyer, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
74. Benjamin L LIEBMAN, “A Populist Threat to China’s Courts?” in Margaret YK WOO and Mary E
GALLAGHER, eds, Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 269 at 282.
75. Personal Interview, Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
76. Ibid.
77. See Zihang XIA, “Cheng Jianlong Bei Xingju ST Jingding Chongzu Xian Zhuanji (陈建龙被刑拘ST金顶
重组现转机) [Hopes Arise After the Arrest of Cheng Jianlong]” Meiri Jingji Xingwen (每日经济新闻)
[National Business Daily] (10 July 2009), online: National Business Daily <http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/
2009-07-09/225422.html> .
78. Personal Interview, Administrator 1, a lawyer, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 5 January 2012.
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the EBL 2006 allows the debtor to regain control under the debtor-in-possession
approach, this interviewee emphasized that this is more a theoretical possibility than a
practical certainty, and that debtors see this as an unreasonably dangerous gamble.79
This fear is not unreasonable. As will be reported below, in most existing
reorganizations, the debtor-in-possession model has not been applied. This suggests
that, for debtors, once managerial control is lost, it is more likely to be lost forever.
Moreover, as observed by one accountant interviewed in this ﬁeld work, at the heart of
debtors’ concerns over losing control is the potential exposure of company books to a
third party, as these books almost inevitably contain evidence of tax evasion.80 This
can be a real problem, especially against the backdrop of China’s tax collection system.
For example, one study has shown that between twelve to thirty-seven percent of value
added tax, the main business tax for China’s central government revenue, was evaded
between 1995 and 2003.81 Indeed, tax evasion is so rampant in China that no
company will be comfortable surrendering its books to outsiders, let alone to hand
them over in their entirety to a court-appointed administrator. For a debtor, losing
control to a third party largely equals exposing its own criminal conduct to others; it is
not only unacceptable but dangerous.
In addition, debtors also have few ﬁnancial incentives to ﬁle for reorganization,
because the absolute priority principle, according to which creditors are to be paid
before shareholders, applied in the vast majority of the reorganizations (87.5 percent)
in Zhejiang. Shareholders received nothing in these cases, since even unsecured
creditors were not paid in full because of the bankruptcy of these companies, meaning
that shareholders or shareholder-managers could not ﬁnancially beneﬁt from the
formal reorganization procedure. To put it another way, in anticipation of zero
distribution, instead of pursuing an in-court reorganization, most debtors would try to
avoid ﬁling for reorganization before a court.
3. The frustration of creditors with reorganizations
China’s new corporate rescue regime does not appear to be debtor-friendly.
However, even in the US, where there is a pro-debtor corporate rescue regime, it has
been found that most debtor-ﬁled formal rescues are in effect commenced
because of imminent liquidation pressure from creditors.82 This means that the
effective use of the corporate bankruptcy rescue regime is also dependent on a rigorous
debt enforcement system in which creditors can easily choose liquidation to
collect debt.
Generally speaking, creditors in Zhejiang only have one option available: namely, to
collect debt through individual debt enforcement. While liquidation exists on paper, it
does not in practice. And without a real threat of creditor-initiated liquidation
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Wen XU, “The Size of Value Added Tax Evasion and Anti-EvasionMeasures in China” (2006) 5 Journal
of China University of Finance 1.
82. Lynn M LOPUCKI, “The Debtor in Full Control – Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code?” (1983) 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 99 at 100 [LoPucki, “Full Control”].
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proceedings, there is no urgency for defaulting debtors to seek the formal
reorganization procedure as a safe haven to avoid aggressive creditors. This was
conﬁrmed by one lawyer interviewee, who said that it is quite naïve for a creditor to ﬁle
for a debtor’s liquidation in a court by solely relying on the written rules embedded in
the EBL 2006, and that lawyers who go to courts to lodge bankruptcy petitions on
behalf of their creditor clients would be seen as inexperienced and could be snubbed by
court ofﬁcials.83 This lawyer further lamented the fact that in order to open a corporate
bankruptcy procedure, creditors must persuade the local government where the debtor
is domiciled to provide support, which is almost an insurmountable task for most
creditors, making such an action even more unlikely where the creditors are from a
different region or outside the province.84
These observations are supported by a typical case recently handled in Zhejiang. On
6October 2008, Shaoxing City-based Jianglong Textile Group Limited ceased trading
because it suffered a sudden illiquidity. After it was found that the chief executive
ofﬁcer (CEO) had previously absconded for days, a panic among creditors led to a total
of 803 individual debt enforcement actions, in the form of litigation, being brought
against Jianglong, most of them taking place in the Zhejiang courts. Unfortunately,
however, no bankruptcy liquidation procedure was entered into, even though the
debtor company was clearly bankrupt; while some creditors did submit liquidation
petitions to the Shaoxing Intermediate People’s Court, which handled most of the
Jianglong litigations, these petitions were simply ignored – indeed, the Court did not
even bother to register them. Later, the company’s assets were auctioned to satisfy these
judgement debts, but as predicted, its assets were not sufﬁcient to meet them all. As a
result, creditors who sued were paid pari passu, while creditors who did not were
excluded from the distribution.85
The above case illustrates the reality that it is unlikely for creditors to conveniently
commence a corporate bankruptcy case in Zhejiang. Interestingly, some Zhejiang
reorganization cases examined in this study were actually ﬁled by company creditors.
As a result, it is reasonable to ask if the odds against creditors in using the bankruptcy
law have been exaggerated. On closer examination, however, it was found that they
were not. In such circumstances, on the face of it, the reorganization procedure was
ﬁled by a creditor, but it soon became apparent that these creditors were insiders or
related parties. For example, in the reorganization procedure of Nanwang Group
Limited, the ﬁling creditor, Sanhua Group Limited, is one of the company’s
shareholders.86 Quite often, after a local government stepped in and decided to
support a court-involved reorganization effort, it was largely to fulﬁl the formality in
choosing which party should sign a ﬁling document. In real terms, then, it was the local
83. Personal Interview, Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
84. Ibid.
85. Qing WANG, Lingling CHAI, and Lingyang DING, “Jingji Handong Li De Yiqu Jiekun Ge (经济寒冬里
的一曲解困歌) [A Relief Song Sung in an Economic Winter]” Shaoxing Ribao (绍兴日报) [Shaoxing
Daily] (26 February 2009) at 6.
86. Hejuan ZHAO, “Nanwang Jituan Chongzhen Fangan Weihuo Tongguo (南望集团重整方案未获通过)
[Nanwang Reorganization Plan Failed]” Caijing Wan (财经网) [Caijing] (29October 2008), online: The
Caijing Magazine < http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-10-29/110024211.html> .
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government rather than a ﬁling party that substantially initiated an in-court
reorganization project.
Another lawyer interviewee said that it had been repeatedly proved in practice that
the corporate bankruptcy procedure, including corporate reorganization, is
unavailable to both creditors and debtors unless a local government intervenes.87 A
natural consequence is that, in China, the absence of a robust corporate bankruptcy
system leads to a situation in which creditors are only protected on a ﬁrst-come-
ﬁrst-served basis, since only individual debt enforcement in the form of litigation is
practically available. Hence, a collective action between creditors could not be initiated
in their interest as a whole, because of the inaction of the state, especially of its
court system.
To sum up, then, while courts in Zhejiang are legally and constitutionally liable to
accept corporate reorganization ﬁlings, they hesitate to do so; debtors possess
information and knowledge but are unwilling to ﬁle for fear of losing control to
outsiders; creditors may force defaulting debtors to enter reorganization earlier but are
largely denied the most powerful legal weapon: liquidation. The combination of these
factors may largely explain why there have been such a small number of
reorganizations in Zhejiang. It is noteworthy in this regard that in Anglo-American
jurisdictions, law courts are bound to accept bankruptcy ﬁlings, regardless of the social
and political impacts of individual cases;88 as a result, the difﬁculties facing Chinese
law courts described above do not arise. Interestingly, the mindset of debtors in China
towards the use of reorganization is similar to that of their counterparts in both the UK
and the US – all try to evade reorganization in order to avoid the loss of control.
But existing research also suggests that, at least in the US, debtors will voluntarily ﬁle
for reorganization in the face of imminent liquidation pressures from creditors.89
Unfortunately, the threat of liquidation used by creditors in Anglo-American
jurisdictions is largely unavailable in China. This is a tough struggle for both China
and Chinese businesses.90
Nevertheless, there are still a certain number of companies entering into the
reorganization procedure in Zhejiang. Therefore, one may ask what the real criteria are
for a Chinese company to be allowed to use reorganization in practice. An important
part of the answer to this question lies in the attitude of governments at either local or
central levels. Indeed, if the continued existence of a company is signiﬁcant enough to
draw the government’s attention, a local court may be guided, if not manipulated, by
the government to initiate a reorganization procedure to try to revive the distressed
company. Otherwise, the statutory rules in the written EBL 2006 appear to be largely
irrelevant to reorganization practice.
87. Personal Interview, Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
88. See generally Charles G GEYH, “Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric”
(2005) 56 Case Western Reserve Law Review 911.
89. LoPucki, “Full Control”, supra note 82 at 100.
90. See the World Bank, Doing Business in China 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010) at 2 (ranking China as seventy-nine out of all 183
economies in respect of ease of doing business, which means China still faces the challenge of building a
business-friendly legal environment).
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C. Control of Zhejiang Corporate Reorganizations
As noted above, while debtors are, in theory, able regain control from administrators if
the debtor-in-possession model is applied, in reality there is only a small chance of this
occurring. Indeed, the debtor-in-possession option was granted in only four out of
fourteen reorganizations, and it is clear that even here the return of control was in name
only, as the key right of proposing the reorganization plan remained in the hands of the
administrators in all four cases.
Administrator control took different forms in these four cases. In the ﬁrst two cases,
the reorganization plan was actually proposed by the administrator,91 while the plan
was jointly proposed by the debtor and the administrator in the third case.92 Indeed,
only in the last case was the debtor-in-possession model used. This was done in order to
use the debtor’s name to propose the reorganization plan;93 however, it is apparent
that the structure and content of the reorganization plan is almost identical to other
administrator-proposed reorganization plans in cases of group reorganizations,94
even though the lawyer interviewee and administrator insisted that the plan was
made by the debtor.95
As a result, it seems that the real debtor-in-possession model has yet to be used in
Zhejiang. This raises the immediate question as to what the real motives behind the
symbolic use of the debtor-in-possession model in these four Zhejiang cases actually
were. One court document may provide a partial answer to this question. According to
this internally-circulated report made by a law court which handled several
reorganizations in Zhejiang, approving the debtor-in-possession model is mainly
aimed at retaining the old management so as to maintain the company’s business
operations where the administrator does not have the skills to do the job, in
consideration of the importance of continuing the company’s normal business
operations to building and maintaining creditors’ conﬁdence in the reorganization
efforts and to attracting potential buyers.96However, the court also clearly stated that,
in this case, the administrator, a local accounting ﬁrm, must still propose the
reorganization plan, in spite of already approving the debtor-in-possession model of
reorganization.97
Arguably, much could be done to improve the understanding of the debtor-
in-possession model by both judges and insolvency practitioners in Zhejiang and in
China as a whole. Turning to the central question as to why debtors were
91. They were one company from Jinghua and another one from Pujiang.
92. The company was from Hangzhou.
93. It was a company from Hangzhou, where the reorganization plan was proposed by the debtor itself, and
the absolute priority rule was bypassed in that case.
94. The Dadi reorganization case was part of a group reorganization procedure of Hualun Group Limited in
the Fuyang City, Zhejiang.
95. Personal Interview, Judge 2, a judge, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 18 January 2012.
96. Pujiang Lower People’s Court, “Zhejiang Tianting Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Pochan Chongzhen Gongzuo
De Jingyan Zongjie (浙江天听纸业有限公司破产重整工作的经验总结) [Experience in Handling the
Reorganization Procedure of Tianting Paper Limited]” 89 (on ﬁle with authors).
97. Ibid.
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overwhelmingly excluded from reorganization procedures in Zhejiang, the causes are
as follows.
1. The lack of sympathy for failed companies
The attitudes of stakeholders towards business failure might be one of the main factors
leading to the automatic removal of debtors. Most of the interviewees considered that
the main contributor to business failure is debtor mismanagement.98 As a result, most
stakeholders have little conﬁdence in the use of the debtor-in-possession model in the
formal reorganization procedure.
Apart from the perceived culpability of management, many interviewees believed
that, in most of the existing reorganizations, business failure was also attributable to
overexpansion by the company.99 These companies had borrowed excessively to fund
their expansion projects, and a sudden fall in liquidity led to the collapse of the
companies.
Interestingly, the stakeholders interviewed seem to be ambivalent about
management’s motives. When asked to what extent the company’s failure was due to
the debtor’s dishonesty or fraud, all interviewees clearly replied that they did not think
that this was a cause; instead they believed that it was a matter of competence rather
than of dishonesty or fraud on the part of management.100 Put differently, there may
still be chances to reconcile the debtor and other stakeholders regarding the use of the
debtor-in-possession model. Nevertheless, the overall situation makes the potential use
of the debtor-in-possession seemingly unacceptable.
2. Where company management teams are disbanded
The absence of the debtor in most reorganizations was also a result of the management
being disbanded prior to the commencement of the formal rescue procedure, thereby
making resort to the debtor-in-possession model unrealistic. It was found that in at
least twelve out of seventeen rescue cases the company ceased trading before its entry
into formal rescue procedures, and that, to a large extent, the debtor’s management
team had stopped operating or had been dissolved once trading had ceased.
Importantly, it was found that the CEO reportedly absconded or was missing in at
least ten out of these twenty reorganizations. Therefore, given the departure or
disappearance of the debtor’s management team, it seems impractical to seek to rely on
the debtor to run the company during the subsequent formal rescue process.
The disbandment of debtors’ management teams not only makes the use of the
debtor-in-possession model impossible but also imposes even greater challenges for
rescue efforts. One lawyer interviewee said that bringing the company’s business
operations back to a working state is essential for the achievability of a rescue, but in
his case nearly all the old senior managers including the CEO had left by the time he
was appointed as the administrator, so that he had to hire a manager from the
company’s major supplier to restore the operations in an effort to win the conﬁdence of
98. Personal Interview, Administrator 1, a lawyer, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 5 January 2012.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
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both the employees and creditors; in this case, this person happened to be a close friend
of the former CEO and was very familiar with the company’s business.101
In a word, in most cases, with the disappearance of the debtor’s management team,
the likelihood of the debtor-in-possession model being invoked is considerably remote.
3. Business sale rescues
The exclusion of debtors from the corporate reorganization process in Zhejiang
may also be due to the wide use of business sale rescues. Speciﬁcally, in fourteen
out of the sixteen Zhejiang reorganizations, the rescue was conducted through a
business sale.102 The sale leaves the new owner to form a new management team
to run the company, making the old team unnecessary. Indeed, in some business sale
rescues, the removal of the old management team has often been a precondition to
attracting buyers. One lawyer interviewee recounted how one buyer in a case he was
involved in was particularly concerned over whether future control of the company
would be undermined if some members of the old management team remained in
ofﬁce.103
Furthermore, in the remaining two cases, which did not resort to the use of business
sales, it was found that since there was no business buyer emerging, creditors had to use
a debt/capital swap to carry out the rescues. This meant that it was left to the creditors
to establish their own management teams to operate the companies, an event that also
made the old management redundant.
4. Application of the absolute priority rule
The absolute priority rule requires that debt be paid before equity, but under Article 87
of the EBL 2006 this rule can be relaxed through a vote by creditors. Where
shareholders and shareholder managers sit behind a debtor, few if any assets will
remain if this rule is fully applied, given that in most cases even creditors could not be
fully paid. In such circumstances, the debtor would not have any incentives to engage in
a formal reorganization procedure.
This was often the case in Zhejiang. As we have seen above, the absolute priority
principle was applied in fourteen out of sixteen Zhejiang corporate reorganizations,
with the debtor losing everything. Arguably, in anticipation of the stringent application
of the absolute priority rule, debtors may deliberately decline the debtor-in-possession
offer. In general, from the point of view of creditors, granting the debtor possession
seems to be too lenient for debtors, but from the point of view of debtors, it can be an
empty privilege that they do not really need.
More importantly, it seems that Zhejiang judges and lawyers tend to favour
the strict application of the absolute priority rule in reorganizations. Asked
whether relaxing this rule can be considered in favour of the old management,
101. Personal Interview, Judge 2, a judge, Fuyang, Zhejiang, China, 17 January 2012.
102. See generally Xinxin WANG, “Chongzheng Zhidu Lilun Yu Shiwu Xinglun (重整制度理论与实务新论)
[Theories and Practices of Corporate Reorganization]” (2012) 11 Falu Shiyun (法律适用) [Journal of
Law Application] 10 (discussing the widely-used going concern sale rescues in China).
103. Personal Interview, Administrator 2, an accountant, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China, 12 January 2012.
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especially shareholder managers, in exchange for their experience and information
in running the business, almost every judge and lawyer interviewee said that this would
be very unfair to creditors, and that they would not consider relaxing absolute
priority.104
To summarize, the infrequent use of the debtor-in-possession approach in Zhejiang
corporate reorganizations can be attributed to the lack of sympathy for business
failures, the departure of debtors’ management teams before reorganizations
commenced, the wide use of business sale rescue, and the strict application of the
absolute priority rule in distributing the remaining company value.
v. discussion
Over the years after the commencement of the EBL 2006, the corporate reorganization
provisions have not been regularly used as expected; as shown by the data in this
article, the vast majority of troubled companies were in fact denied the chance to use
this law. (It is worth noting that similar reasons or obstacles have resulted in the
liquidation and conciliation procedures sharing a similar fate.) From our discussion of
the reasons for this, it seems that one of the root causes is China’s weak judicial system
and its less-developed rule of law.
A. Judicial Independence and Accountability
Generally speaking, China’s courts have a certain degree of judicial independence,
especially when handling commercial cases.105 For commercial issues, at least in
theory, there is little government intervention,106 although it should be noted that
courts may be vulnerable to pressures if well-connected parties are involved.107
Corporate bankruptcy reorganizations fall into the category of commercial cases, since
most parties are businesses. Hence, courts are assumed to accept reorganizations in the
way they accept other commercial litigation.
However, one aspect of corporate reorganization makes most Chinese judges anxious
– they always involve a large number of people who are either employees or creditors,
which is likely to generate mass petitions or protests.108 The real problem here is that
courts and the judges in charge will be negatively assessed and may even be disciplined by
local Communist-Party-controlled governmentswhere such protests arise,109 even if these
104. Personal Interview, Administrator 8, a lawyer, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 6 January 2012.
105. It would be quite difﬁcult for Chinese courts to remain independent when handling administrative cases in
which government authorities are challenged by citizens. See generally Kevin J O’BRIEN and Lianjiang
LI, “Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China” in Neil J DIAMANT, Stanley B
LUBMAN, and Kevin J O’BRIEN, eds, Engaging the Law in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2005), 31.
106. See Xin HE, “The Recent Decline in Economic Caseloads in Chinese Courts: Exploration of a Surprising
Puzzle” (2007) 190 The China Quarterly 352 at 371
107. See generally Ling LI, “Performing Bribery in China: Guanxi-Practice, Corruption with a Human Face”
(2011) 20 Journal of Contemporary China 1 (noting the rampant bribe-taking of judges in China).
108. Liebman, supra note 74 at 282.
109. Nicholas CHOWSON, “China’s Judicial System and Judicial Reform” (2011) 54 LawQuadrangle 62 at 64.
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protests are not essentially caused by judges.110 The unwritten Chinese social stability
assessment system seems to be irrationally made and enforced.111
In reality, most Chinese courts face a dilemma. On the one hand, courts must do
what the law says; in the context of the new corporate reorganization law, this means
that courts must accept corporate reorganization ﬁlings if the statutory requirements
are met, whether or not a large number of individuals are involved.112 On the other
hand, Chinese courts must make local Communist-Party-controlled governments
happy, although what the latter impose may not be in line with what the law explicitly
stipulates.113 This lack of judicial independence from local governments reﬂects one of
China’s deep-rooted constitutional problems and results in the courts’ refraining from
handling many corporate reorganization cases.114
Furthermore, the lack of judicial independence also raises serious concerns about the
lack of judicial accountability. According to constitutional theories,115 as public
authorities courts must be held accountable if they violate the law.116 But this does not
look to be the case in China. One typical example pertains to the ﬁling of a corporate
reorganization under Article 10 of the EBL 2006. While the court must either accept or
reject the ﬁling according to the law, in reality, the court does not even register the
ﬁling inmost cases,117 let alone respond to it.118This is clearly a violation of this Article.119
110. Liming Wang also mentions that Chinese courts are anxious in accepting petitions of minority
shareholders against Chinese listed companies, because plaintiffs are usually very large in numbers. See
Liming WANG, “Security Tort Remedies for Minority Shareholders in Chinese Stock Markets” (2012)
6 Securities Law Review 6.
111. Professor Xinxin Wang also argues that courts are usually unfairly treated by governments when
handling corporate reorganization matters in China. See Wang, “Difﬁculties of Commencing”, supra
note 35 at 30. See also Jiaolong TAO and Jian CHEN, “Xingfang Zhidu De Fansi Yu Chonggou
(信访制度的反思与重构) [Problems and Perspectives of the Xing Fang System]” (2006) 5 Falu Shiyun
(法律适用) [Journal of Law Application] 76 at 78 (noting that courts and judges will be disciplined even if
a mass petition is not because of their fault).
112. See generally Carl F MINZNER, “China’s Turn Against Law” (2011) 59 American Journal of
Comparative Law 935.
113. See the Social Development Research Team of Tsinghua University, “China’s Sustainable Social Security
Should be Based on Freedom of Expression” (April 2010) (this report criticizes China’s current social
stability assessment systems, warning that these systems are counterproductive and unsustainable).
114. See generally Paul GEWIRTZ, “Independence and Accountability of Courts” (2002) 1 Global Law
Review 7.
115. See generallyMargaret Jane RADIN, “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” (1989) 69 Boston University Law
Review 781 (arguing that the rule of law requires that all public authorities must be held accountable). See
also UNSC, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conﬂict and Post-Conﬂict Societies: Report of
the Secretary-General”, UN Doc S/2004/616 (23 August 2004), online: The United Nations, Inter-
Parliamentary Union < http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf> .
116. SeeWilliam JWOODWARD, Jr, “‘Control’ in Reorganization Law and Practice in China and the United
States: An Essay on the Study of Contrast” (2008) 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal
141 at 144 (arguing that the court acceptance procedure may cause delay and inefﬁciency in corporate
reorganizations in China).
117. Wang, “Difﬁculties of Commencing”, supra note 35 at 32.
118. Weiguo WANG, Hailin ZOU, and Yongjun LI, “Pochanfa Shinian (破产法十年) [Ten Years of Drafting
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law]” (Seminar of the Civil and Commercial Law Centre, China University of
Political Science and Law, 12 March 2004), online: The Civil and Commercial Law Centre of China
University of Political Science and Law < http://www.cupl.edu.cn:81/html/msjjfxy_xsw/col531/2011-11/
19/20111119110131584730800_1.html> .
119. See generally Guillermo O’DONNELL, “Why the Rule of Law Matters” (2004) 15 Journal of
Democracy 32.
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But while it may be shocking from the view of people in advanced jurisdictions, this
practice is repeated time and again in China. And while this is arguably caused by the lack
of checks on power in general and on the judiciary in particular, there are no reports of any
court ofﬁcials having been disciplined or prosecuted because of these failures or violations.
In this way, China’s courts can be said to be both victims and offenders.
To a certain degree, this problem is unique to China. Global indicators may help
capture just how severe China’s rule of law deﬁcit actually is. According to The World
Justice Project,120 China is ranked 82nd out of all 97 surveyed countries across the
world with respect to the efﬁciency of delivering civil justice (implementing corporate
bankruptcy law can be largely included in this category) – almost at the bottom –while
noting that the country’s major challenge is that law courts are not free from
government intervention. Even within middle-income countries, The World Justice
Project suggests that China is still ranked 27th out of a total of 30 jurisdictions,121
clearly suggesting that it is largely China’s political system rather than its economic
development that has led to the country’s stunted development of the rule of law.122
Of course, apart from the entrenchedweakness of its judicial system,Chinese law courts
do have other difﬁculties, such as understafﬁng, but these difﬁculties could be easily
overcome without resorting to institutional reforms. Reforming the Chinese judicial
system is a formidable task and is beyond the scope of this article. Realistically, however,
under the current legal framework, some technical issues can be improved or clariﬁed with
the aim of promoting the use of the corporate reorganization law in China.
B. Encouragement of Debtors and Creditors
1. The automatic debtor-in-possession model
To encourage more rescues, debtors should be given certainty with regard to the use of
the debtor-in-possession model. As examined earlier, at the top of most debtors’
concerns is a fear of losing control to outsiders under the administrator-in-possession
model if an in-court reorganization solution is sought. To incentivize debtors to use the
reorganization procedure, and to make reorganizations more feasible by taking
advantage of their experience and knowledge in running their businesses, it seems
desirable to establish the debtor-in-possession model as the default approach in
corporate reorganization. This can be done for a number of reasons.
First, according to Professor ZouHailing, one of the EBL 2006’s draftsmen, Chinese
lawmakers initially intended to set up the debtor-in-possession model as the default
control structure in reorganizations.123 However, such an intention has not been
clearly embodied or demonstrated in the new law. This is partly due to ﬂaws in the
design of the EBL 2006. For example, Article 13 places both reorganization and
liquidation procedures together, and both are commenced with the automatic
120. Mark David AGRAST et al.,Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 (Washington, DC: TheWorld Justice Project,
2012-2013).
121. Ibid.
122. See generally Pitman B POTTER, “Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective
Adaptation” (2004) 29 Law & Social Inquiry 465.
123. Zou, supra note 9 at 50-51.
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appointment of an administrator without taking into account the differences between
the two procedures. And although Article 73 allows a debtor to apply for the use of the
debtor-in-possession model after the commencement of the procedure, this often seems
too late, since the debtor has already lost control of the company and must face
uncertainty whether the debtor-in-possession model can be granted in the meantime.
All this suggests that there is a gap between what the lawmakers genuinely intended
and what is actually stipulated in the EBL 2006.124
Second, the data reported here from ﬁeldwork interviews show that allowing debtors to
remain in control seems to be socially acceptable to many stakeholders in China. It should
not be forgotten that in the interviews no debtors were accused of being fraudulent or
dishonest, although most business failures were perceived as the result of the debtor’s
mismanagement. Thus, most debtors are probably still trustworthy, since business failures
are more likely to result from mistakes. This paves the way for the use of the debtor-in-
possession model in China’s corporate reorganizations.125
Third, the lessons learnt from abroad can also convince us of the usefulness of the
debtor-in-possession model in encouraging voluntary rescue ﬁlings. In the US, for
example, before 1939, this model was the default control model for all debtor
companies, whether they were large or small companies. However, for fear of abuses,
the Chandler Act of 1939 removed the debtor-in-possession model in the
reorganization procedure of large companies, which led to the situation that the new
procedure for these companies immediately “fell into disuse.”126 Decades later, in the
light of the hostility of large debtor companies towards the automatic practitioner-
in-possession model, the US Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 eventually restored
the debtor-in-possession model for large companies,127 and history suggests that this was
the right approach to take. South Korea’s experience with transplanting the debtor-in-
possessionmodel of corporate reorganization also suggests the utility of leaving the debtor
in control of corporate decision-making, the number of reorganization ﬁlings in South
Korea soared from seventy-six in 2006 – the time South Korea adopted themodel – to 670
in 2009, almost a tenfold increase over only four years.128
Overall, the legal landscape of China’s corporate reorganization law may be
remarkably improved if the debtor-in-possession model is embraced as a default
option. Of course, a fair balance should be struck between debtor and creditor, with
creditors empowered to challenge the debtor-in-possession in cases where fraud has
been committed.
124. Jiaolong TAO and Hexing SHI, “Sifa Shiwu Shiye Xia Pochan Chongzheng Zhidu RuoganWenti Yanjiu
(司法实务视野下破产重整制度若干问题研究) [Challenges of Corporate Reorganization in Judicial
Practice]” (2012) 11 Falu Shiyun (法律适用) [Journal of Law Application] 30.
125. See generally Laurence G WEINZIMMER and Jim MCCONOUGHEY, The Wisdom of Failures
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013).
126. Lynn M LOPUCKI and William C WHITFORD, “Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies” (1993) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 669 at 675. See also Theodore EISENBERG, “Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11” (1993)
43 University of Toronto Law Journal 633 at 664.
127. Lawrence P KING, “Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code” (1979) 53 American Bankruptcy Law
Journal 107 at 114-115.
128. The World Bank, supra note 90 at 75.
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2. Empowering creditors with the threat of liquidation
Prioritizing the debtor-in-possession model is necessary but not enough to incentivize
debtors to ﬁle for reorganization in a voluntary and early manner. This is especially
true given that ﬁling for a bankruptcy reorganization will, among other things, damage
a debtor’s reputation.129 Thus, consideration should also be given to empowering
creditors to pressure defaulting debtors to enter reorganization earlier.
Technically, a lack of information means that most creditors are unable to pursue
an in-court reorganization on behalf of the debtor. This suggests that it is better
for the reorganization to be initiated by the debtor itself.130 Of course, in exceptional
instances, some long-term suppliers and bank creditors may possess sufﬁcient
information to launch a viable reorganization petition; however, bearing in mind the
collective action problems faced by these creditors,131 relying on them to bring a debtor
into a complex reorganization procedure in the interest of creditors as a whole seems
unrealistic.
In order to promote more feasible debtor-initiated corporate reorganizations, what
creditors can do, and are really expected to do, is to use the threat of liquidation to
force debtors to ﬁle for (an early) reorganization. An empirical study from the US
indicates that although debtors could use the debtor-in-possession model under
Chapter 11 to retain control in the corporate reorganization procedure, seventy-three
percent of reorganization ﬁlings are substantially triggered by creditors threatening
liquidation.132 Without this threat of liquidation, the vast majority of debtors will
continue to delay action until business conditions deteriorate past the point of no
return. In China, however, equipping creditors with this powerful fulcrum remains a
great challenge. For various reasons demonstrated in this article, the threat of
liquidation133 is unavailable to creditors,134 resulting in the threat of liquidation
enshrined in the EBL 2006 remaining a paper tiger.
vi. conclusion
While Zhejiang has pioneered the use of the new corporate reorganization law to
rehabilitate distressed local companies, the implementation of this law in a well-
developed Chinese province such as Zhejiang remains far below expectations,
especially when compared to other developed jurisdictions such as the UK or the US.
129. See David A SKEEL, Jr, “Bankruptcy Phobia” (2009) 82 Temple Law Review 333.
130. See Kenneth B AXE, “Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Representing Secured Creditors in Chapter 11”
(1984) 67Marquette Law Review 421 at 423.
131. See LemmaW SENBET and James K SEWARD, “Financial Distress, Bankruptcy and Reorganization” in
RA JARROW, V MAKSIMOVIC, and WT ZIEMBA, eds, Handbooks in Operation Research and
Management Science, vol 9 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), 921 at 933.
132. LoPucki, “Full Control”, supra note 82 at 100.
133. See Donald C CLARKE, “The Execution of Civil Judgements in China” (1995) 141 The China Quarterly
65. See also Donald C CLARKE, “Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of
Civil Judgements” (1996) 10 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1.
134. See Changyin HAN and Huan HE, “Pochan Jiexian De Lifa Gongneng Wenti (破产界限的立法功能问题)
[Problems of the Bankruptcy Tests]” (2013) 2 Zhenzhi Yu Falu (政治与法律) [Politics and Law]
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This article has demonstrated that this failing can be linked to the lack of judicial
independence135 and accountability,136 as well as the hostility of debtors towards the
administrator-in-possession procedure.137 It has also suggested four reasons
explaining the surprisingly limited use of the debtor-in-possession procedure in
China, mostly linked to perceptions about the regime’s treatment of debtors.
Yet it should also be remembered that this process remains in its infancy, and that no
formal court-supervized corporate reorganization regime existed in China before
2006. Moreover, the fact that most reorganized companies in Zhejiang were large and
of economic and social importance has resulted in intense local media attention, both
locally and nationally, which has raised considerable awareness of the corporate
reorganization procedure among the business community and the general public and
helped address concerns about the lack of information. Armed with this new
information, one might well expect the number of reorganizations to increase.
In the meantime, the existing reorganizations in Zhejiang continue to raise a number
of important legal questions for academic researchers. For example, in response to the
reorganization procedure for company groups, some Zhejiang courts have boldly
consolidated company reorganization cases, whereas some have acted more cautiously
and handled them separately.138Given the difﬁculty or impracticality of separating the
assets and liabilities of related companies within a group, the issue of how best to
balance fairness against feasibility in group reorganizations remains.
135. See generally Lily L TSAI, Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods
Provision in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
136. Peter H SOLOMON Jr, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes” (2007) 60World Politics 122.
137. See Elizabeth C ECONOMY, “The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China’s Environmental Crisis”
(2007) 86 Foreign Affairs 38 at 39.
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Sifa Shencha (重整程序开始的条件及司法审查) [The Conditions of the Beginning of the Reorganization
Procedure and Its Judicial Review: A Query Into the Merger Reorganization]” (2013) 26 Beijing
Hangkong Hangtian Daxue Xuebao (北京航空航天大学学报) [Journal of Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (Social Sciences Edition)] 48, and Xinxin WANG and Wei ZHOU,
“Guanlian Qiye De Hebin Pochan Chongchen Qidong Yanjiu (关联企业的合并破产重整启动研究)
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[Tribune of Political Science and Law] 72. See also Gilbert J STEPHEN, “Substantive Consolidation in
Bankruptcy: A Primer” (1990) 43 Vanderbilt Law Review 207 (discussing bankruptcy consolidation in
the US), and The Jones Day LLP, “Substantive Consolidation and Non-debtor Entities: The Fight
Continues” (May/June 2011), online, The Jones Day LLP < http://www.jonesday.com/Substantive-
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